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This paper presents a detailed theoretical derivation and justification for methods used to 
compute  solutions  to  a multi-period (including  infinite-period),  continuum-agent,  unobserved- 
effort economy.  Actual solutions are displayed illustrating cross-sectional variability in consump- 
tion and labour effort in the population at a point in time and variability for a typical individual 
over time.  The optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives is explored and the issue of 
excess  variability is addressed by consideration  of the analogue  full-information economy  and 
various restricted-contracting regimes. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A strong but troublesome  prediction of  stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic 
models  is  the  extreme  level  of  risk-sharing.  Even  in  macroeconomic  models  with 
endogenously derived population diversity in labour effort (e.g. Rogerson (1988), Hansen 
(1985)) there is, nevertheless, full consumption  insurance.  That is, an individual's con- 
sumption does not depend on his labour effort or the resulting productivity of that effort. 
In the absence  of  either aggregate shocks  or individual preference shocks this implies 
constant  consumption  for  each  individual  over time.  In the  absence  of  preference or 
initial  wealth  or  Pareto-weight diversity this  implies  equal  consumption  levels  across 
individuals at a point in time. Such predictions seem implausible. 
Introducing unobserved actions or other "incentive problems" has long held promise 
of  helping  to  reconcile  stochastic  general  equilibrium macro models  with  apparently 
incomplete  insurance. The idea, simple enough,  is that full consumption  insurance has 
adverse incentive  effects  on  effort.  Thus  consumption  dependent  on  labour effort or 
labour productivity  may be  desirable  ex  ante.  Unfortunately,  the  characterization of 
solutions  to  incentive-constrained  economies,  and  especially  dynamic  incentive- 
constrained economies,  has proved difficult. Analytic treatments have tended to provide 
disappointingly  weak characterizations, even with unintuitive and stringent restrictions 
on technologies  and preferences.  Analytic treatments of repeated incentive-constrained 
economies  have been hampered by the history-dependent nature of solutions.' 
Some recent contributions have made important progress.  Perhaps the most salient 
among these  is  Fudenberg,  Holmstrom, and  Milgrom (1986)  which  shows  that under 
some assumptions there need be no history-dependence  and that an optimal long-term 
agreement can be replicated by a series of  single-period  contracts.  These assumptions 
are (1) exponential utility in consumption for the agent, (2) uncontrolled access to credit 
on the part of the agent, as if this were unobserved, and (3) a disutility cost for action 
1. See Rogerson (1985) and Townsend  (1982) for a proof of the necessity of such history-dependence. 
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which is like a financial cost and hence subtracted linearly from consumption.  As they 
note, the ability to control consumption is crucial, and much of the earlier literature is 
exploiting  this possibility.  The exponential  utility function removes wealth effects, and 
this also seems to be crucial. In any event, our paper should be viewed as a complementary 
effort; we are able to display solutions without any of these restrictions. 
Our alternative to  further search for analytic theorems is to  present and justify  a 
method  for computing  solutions  to  a repeated, continuum-agent version of the classic 
agency problem. We believe the method we present is sufficiently general to readily extend 
to  a less  restricted set of  incentive  constrained frameworks.  Again,  such methods  are 
important because in the absence of analytic solutions,  computing solutions is the only 
way to discover the characteristics of a model and the only way to allow for the eventual 
comparison of a model to data. 
Any method for computing solutions must be formally justified.  Specifically for us, 
this  means  proving  we  have  defined  a  problem  for which  a solution  exists,  that our 
reduction to a dynamic programming framework is valid, that our computation method 
is guaranteed to converge, and that this converged solution is the solution to the original 
problem. This paper presents a sequence of theorems to that effect. 
We also explore the characteristics of the classic prototype agency model by displaying 
computed  solutions  to  it  and  by  contrasting these  to  the  solutions  of  the  analogue 
full-information economy.  In full-information solutions, consumption and labour efforts 
(actions)  are constant for individuals over time (full insurance) and population distribu- 
tions  are degenerate if there is no initial diversity. As foreshadowed  above,  computed 
solutions to the incentive-constrained model overturn these predictions.  Computed solu- 
tions are also contrasted with solutions (also computed) to the agency problem restricted 
to  one-period  contracts.  This  restriction induces  greater consumption  variability and 
lower average output than the incentive-constrained solution without this restriction. We 
thus illustrate the (computed)  optimal tradeoff between insurance and incentives and the 
effect of multi-period contracting on such environments. 
This work is derived mainly from three somewhat distinct lines of research in the 
literature. One line is represented by Prescott and Townsend (1984a, b), who demonstrate 
the  ability  to  analyze  incentive-constrained  economies  in  the  space  of  measures  of 
economic  variables.  Relatedly,  Townsend  (1987,  1988) numerically  simulates  a  wide 
variety of static or short-horizon incentive-constrained economies  using linear program- 
ming techniques. 
Another line of research is represented by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986), and 
by Spear and Srivastava (1987) who provide the key insight into the nature of history- 
dependent solutions needed to yield a computationally-feasible  repeated formulation of 
the problem. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti show for an unobserved-action, cartel problem 
that a given  history can be  sufficiently represented by the expected  profit of the cartel 
members from the given time on.  This gives a state variable similar to the amount of 
capital in  a growth problem.  Spear and  Srivastava extend  this to  the infinite-horizon 
principal-agent problem where the state variable is the expected utility of the agent. 
Lastly, Green (1987) analyzes a closely related continuum-agent endowment economy 
with private information concerning the individual endowments.  In our conclusion,  we 
argue that our methods  apply to  this economy  as well.  This paper builds directly on 
Spear and Srivastava, but extends the principal-agent problem to a continuum of agents, 
and uses  a formulation  consistent  with the  measure-space techniques  of  Prescott and 
Townsend  (1984a, b).  These  steps allow  the numerical computation  of  solutions.  We 
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in a context in which society has access to an unlimited linear borrowing-lending tech- 
nology.  Finally, we emphasize here a sequence  of theorems which justify the recursive 
formulation of our framework. 
We will  focus  heavily  on  the  relationships  among  the  full-information  (or fully- 
observed-action) economy, the static unobserved-action economy, and the repeated unob- 
served-action economy.  Section 2 introduces the full-information problem, in our some- 
what unorthodox, more general manner of stating the problem, with lotteries.  Section 3 
alters this environment to the static unobserved-action economy  and then discusses and 
displays the nature of solutions.  Section 4 considers the repeated version of the agency 
problem and displays and discusses computed solutions.  Section 5 gives a sequence of 
theorems justifying the recursive formulation used to solve the repeated problems. Section 
6 gives an overview of the computational methods used, and Section 7 offers a conclusion. 
II.  THE  FULL-INFORMATION  ECONOMY 
In this  section,  we  consider  the  social  planning  problem for an economy  with  a 
continuum  of  identical  agents  each  having  an  identical  but  independent  production 
technology taking in an agent's own labour and producing the single consumption good 
as a function of this labour and an independent shock.  Our method of finding the Pareto 
optima  for  the  economy  is  to  maximize  social  surplus subject to  each  of  the  agents 
receiving exactly a prespecified ex ante expected utility. Social surplus is defined as the 
total amount of the consumption good that is produced but not eaten.  A Pareto optimum 
for this economy is then a solution to this problem for an initial distribution of required 
utilities which gives a non-negative  surplus, so that it is feasible,  and has the property 
that any other distribution of initial utilities that Pareto-dominates the initial distribution 
has a negative surplus and thus is not feasible.2 
The social contract or planning problem assigns to each agent an action, a, from a 
finite set of  possible  actions  A c R .3  We assume the contractual rule for determining 
this action may be probabilistic.  Such an action for a given agent results in the realization 
of  an output quantity q,  an element of a finite set  Q c  lR,.  For a given action,  a E A, 
output is determined by an exogenous probability P(q I  a).  Probability P(q I  a) is assumed 
strictly positive so that any output is possible given any action.  No other restrictions are 
put on the technology  such as likelihood  ratio or convexity  conditions  common in the 
literature. The social contract, again allowing for mixed outcomes, then gives each agent 
some consumption  amount c E C where C is again some finite subset of lR,. 
Mixed or probabilistic outcomes for the individual are assumed to be possible without 
having uncertainty in the  aggregate due to  the  continuum  of  agents.  This is justified 
formally in Judd (1985).4  Indeed, all probability measures used in our discussion,  here 
and below,  are viewed at the aggregate level as representing population fractions and at 
the individual level as representing probabilities. 
The utility function for each agent is denoted by  U(a,  c): R, x R+  -> lR+. For given 
A x C c  lR+  x R+, U(a,  c) is assumed bounded  on A x C.  Further, for all else equal, the 
agent prefers lower action and higher consumption. We need not assume separability in 
2.  Green uses and justifies this method as the dual programming problem to that of maximizing utilities 
subject to an initial wealth constraint. 
3.  Sets are denoted by upper-case bold type.  Subsets are denoted by lower case bold type. 
4.  Judd proves the existence  of  a measure assigning joint-output  probabilities over all agents taking a 
given action which is consistent with independence, the individual measures P(q I  a),  and where a law of large 
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the a, c components except to allow quicker computation methods.  Preferences towards 
risk are characterized by expected utility. 
Lastly, we  make additional  assumptions  when  discussing  the nature of  solutions. 
First, we assume that  U(a,  c) is strictly concave over changes in c, holding the action a 
constant. Second,  we assume that higher actions imply greater expected  output.  These 
assumptions do not affect the validity of our methods of finding solutions. 
The lowest ex ante utility level possible for an agent is that of receiving with certainty 
the lowest  consumption  in  C  and the highest labour assignment in A.  We denote this 
utility by w.  The highest utility is that of receiving with certainty the highest consumption 
amount and the lowest labour.  This utility is denoted by  v. Any utility level w between 
w and  iwP  and hence  representable as  asw+(l  - a)  ,  for some  number a,  0_  a  1,  is 
possible by giving fraction of a of those required to receive w the plan yielding w4  specified 
above and fraction (1 -  a)  the plan yielding  w specified above. As fractions are viewed 
as probabilities  by the  individual  agents, expected  utility for the  individual  would  be 
w = aw + (1-  a) w  as required.  Thus the set of possible  ex ante expected utilities is an 
interval,  W=  [w, w].  We assume that the initial distribution of required utilities in the 
population  has finite support and define do(w) to be the fraction of agents whose initial 
required utility is w. Object do is then the associated distribution of exact ex ante expected 
utility levels as opposed  to lower bounds on ex ante expected utility. 
For each utility such that do(w) > 0 the choice variables for society in the planning 
problem can be written as HW(a, q, c): the probability for an agent required to receive w 
of taking action a, having output q occur in his own production technology and receiving 
consumption  amount  c.  Object  [1W  thus  defines  a probability  measure.  Again,  HIW(a, q, c) 
is also the fraction of those agents promised w who will be assigned action a, get output 
q, and receive consumption  c. For a given w E W, we define a contract as such a function 
[1W  which  satisfies  the  following  constraints. 
First, that the discounted expected utility for the agents required to get w is actually 
w, or, 
Cl.  W=EAXQXC  U[a,  c]HW(a,  q, c). 
Second, since a given probability measure [IW  implies conditional probabilities of outputs 
given an action but is nevertheless a choice  object, it must be constrained so that these 
implied  conditional  probabilities  coincide  with  the  ones  imposed  by  nature, namely 
P(qIa).  That is, for all (a, q) E A x Q, 
C2.  EYc  HW(d, 4, c) =  P(qI a)  ZQXC  IlW(c, q, c). 
Lastly, we require that [IW actually represent a probability measure, or, 
C3.  EAxQxCllw(a,q,c)=l  and for all (a,q,c)eAxQxC,  [1W(a,q  c)?  O. 
For a given distribution do over required ex ante expected utility w E W, we define 
an allocation as a collection  of contracts for each w in the support do(w).  The planning 
problem is then to maximize total social  surplus by separately maximizing the surplus 
from each utility group.  This separation is valid because constraints Cl  through C3 must 
hold  separately for  each  we  W.  The  choice  of  one  contract  I[W  does  not  affect the 
constraint set for choosing the contract for another ex ante utility w. Again, since one is 
just determining fractions in a population,  the surplus from each utility group and thus 
total social  surplus is  a  non-random number-there  is  no  aggregate uncertainty.  We 
formally define the programming problem for finding surplus-maximizing contracts as PHELAN  & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  857 
Full Information Problem (FIP).  Maximize by choice  of  probability measure [1W 
the  objective  function,  s(w)  =AXQXC(q  -  c) IIW  (a,  q, c)  subject  to  I[W  satisfying  Cl 
through C3. 
Call solutions to these problems r1W* with corresponding optimized surplus values s*(w). 
Total social surplus for initial distribution do is then S*(do) =  w s*(w)do(w).  An initial 
distribution of ex ante expected utilities do is feasible if S*(do) > 0. 
Lastly, we must specify when solutions to the above programming  problem correspond 
to Pareto optima.  An initial distribution of utilities do and its associated surplus maximiz- 
ing  plans  {17IW*}Ew  represent  a  Pareto  optimum  if  the  support  of  do lies  within  the 
non-increasing portion of s*(w). 
The first step in the argument is to show that the function s*(w):  W ->  lR  is weakly 
concave.  Linear combinations (where the weights add to unity) of HI  functions satisfying 
C2 and C3 themselves satisfy C2 and C3, and satisfy Cl,  the utility constraint, where w 
is the interpolated ex ante utility for the agent.  Thus this linear combination is a feasible 
plan for delivering this interpolated w. Since the linear combination yields the interpolated 
surplus, the optimized surplus function s*(w)  is at least linear. 
Given concavity, s*(w)  has at most one maximum.  For an allocation to be Pareto 
optimal, we need only to require that all initial required utilities are on the downward- 
sloping portion of s*(w),  and that aggregate surplus is zero.  That is, it is not possible 
to  raise the  utility of  a subset  of  agents without  lowering aggregate surplus and thus 
violating aggregate feasibility.  Formally, an initial distribution of utilities do(w) and its 
associated  surplus  maximizing  plans  {1IW*}W  "w  represent  a Pareto  optimum  if aggregate 
surplus is zero and all points in the support of do(w) are weakly greater than the argmax 
of  s*(w).5 
It is important to note that for a given w, FIP is a linear programme. The expression 
(q -  c) in the objective function and expressions  P(q I  a)  and  U[a,  c] in the constraints 
are simply coefficients on the choice variables IHW(a,  q, c).  This allows FIP to be solved 
numerically for each w E W using a standard revised simplex algorithm. 
Solutions to FIP display the full-insurance characteristics common to full-information 
programmes.  If  a given  contract specified  large variations in  leisure  or consumption 
among a set of agents required to receive a given ex ante utility, another contract with 
slightly  less  mean leisure  or consumption  but less  variability would  keep the ex  ante 
expected utilities of the agents constant while raising the social surplus.  Thus variation 
will exist only where such tightenings are not possible, that is when further tightenings 
are impeded by the finiteness of sets A and C. 
For example, suppose there is only one action (full leisure), the consumption set C 
consists of the integers 10, 1, 4, 5}, and U(a,  c) = c0o5.  If all agents are required to receive 
an ex ante expected utility of  1-5, then some uncertainty in consumption is required to 
deliver this ex ante utility.  Nevertheless, the curvature of the utility function will make 
it optimal to  mix between  the adjacent points  1 and 4  (with 0-5 probability on each). 
This is the smallest possible  spread. 
If Q = {q, 4} and each of these outputs occurs with 0 5 probability, then one solution 
to this FIP is to set [1i5(0, q, 1) = 05,  and H'  4(o  4, 4) =  05  (all other [1  5(0,  q, c) =  0). 
That is, give high consumption to those with high output.  However, it is also a solution 
to  set  [115  (0,  q, 4) = 0-5,  and  [1'5(0,  4, 1) =  0-5  (all  other  [1  5(0,  q, c) =  0).  That  is,  give 
high consumption to those with low output.  It is also optimal to set I  15(o,  q, 1) = 0-25, 
5.  In the  full-information  programme, the  argmax of  s*(w)  is  w.  This property does  not hold  when 
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1115(0, q, 1) = 0-25, ri1.5(0,  q, 4) = 0-25, and  H15(0, q, 4) = 0-25 (all other II1H5(0,  q, c) = 0). 
Specifically, there will be at most coincidental dependence of an agent's consumption on 
his output.  Further all variation will diminish as more and more intermediate points are 
added to C. Recall again that aggregate output for such a group of agents is predetermined 
by specified actions-there  is no aggregate risk and thus no need for individuals to bear 
any. 
III.  THE  STATIC  UNOBSERVED-ACTION  ECONOMY. 
The static unobserved-action economy is identical to the full information economy except 
that an agent's action is unobservable by everyone  other than the agent himself.  The 
social contract can recommend actions, but since actions are unobserved, each agent can 
contemplate deviating from the action recommended for him.  The contract-design prob- 
lem for a given w thus is identical to the full-information problem except for additional 
constraints requiring that obeying the action recommendation is always weakly preferred.6 
For a given w E W, these additional constraints require that once the recommended 
action a is announced, that the expected utility of obeying the recommendation is greater 
than that of  each  possible  deviation.  These  constraints take the  general form for  all 
assigned and possible  alternative action pairs (a, a) E A x A, 
ZQxC  U[a,  c]{lw(c  I q, a)P(q  I  a)} i_ 2Qxc  U[6,  c]{l1w(c  I q, a)P(q  I  a)}, 
where 11w(c  I  q, a)  is the conditional  probability implied by IHw(a, q, c).  The expression 
{I`w(c I  q, a)  P(q  I  a)}  is the probability of a given (q, c) combination given that action a 
is  recommended  and  that  this  action  is  taken.  Likewise,  the  expression  {IHw(c I  q, a) 
P(q I  ac)}  is the probability of a given (q, c) combination given that action a is announced 
and deviation action a'  is taken instead.  Given that Hw(q,  c  a) = Hw(c  I  q, a)  P(q I  a)  we 
can solve  for IwI(c I  q, a),  substitute this on  each  side  of  the  incentive  constraint, and 
simplify to get 
ZQxc  U[a,  c]HW(q, c| a)  EQxc  U[a,  c]  P(q  [  )  Iw(q  c/ a).  P(q Ia)  1 
Finally, one can multiply both sides of this by the marginal probability of action a, Hw(a) 
(where this derived from Iw(a,  q, c) by summing over q and c).  HW(a) is either zero, in 
which case the incentive constraint does not matter because a is never recommended, or 
positive, in which case the inequality is essentially unaltered.  This yields 
C4.  Z.Qxc  U[a,  c]HW(a,  q, c)-EQxc  u[aA  c] P(q  [ Iw(a  q, c).  C4.  al  ~~~~~~~~P(qjIa)  1 
Ratio P(q  a )/P(q  I  a)  gives how many more times likely it is that output q will occur 
given deviation action a' as opposed to recommended action a, and thus updates the joint 
probability of observing recommended action a, output q, and consumption  c. 
6.  Another difference is that because of these constraints the set of possible ex ante expected utilities  W 
has a higher lower bound.  Since actions must be induced, the lowest possible ex ante expected utility for the 
unobserved action economy is that of receiving the lowest consumption and the lowest labour amount: at least 
this utility can be achieved unilaterally by any agent under any contract specifying consumptions c as a function 
of outputs q simply by taking the lowest action.  For any utility lower than this, every plan will violate C4 (see 
below).  It is important to note that this is not a participation constraint but simply a consequence of assuming 
unobserved actions.  Again, for reasons given earlier all utilities between this lower bound and the previous 
upper bound on ex ante utility are possible through randomization schemes. PHELAN  & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  859 
The most significant change in the character of solutions to the unobserved action 
problem  as  opposed  to  solutions  to  the  full-information  problem  is  that  if  the  full- 
information solution  specifies  any action other than the lower bound  on actions, then 
the full-insurance  outcome  violates  an incentive  constraint.  If the consumption  of  an 
individual does  not depend  on the output of that individual, as in the full-information 
solution, then it is always preferable for this agent to take a lower action; this raises his 
utility directly and does  not affect his consumption,  even though such an action would 
change the probabilities of his own outputs.  Thus, in general, solutions will not display 
full insurance. 
Figures 1 through 4 display solutions to both the full information and unobserved 
action  planning  problems.  The  period-by-period  utility  function  for  each  agent  is 
U[a,  c]-=[(c?5/.05)+((1-a)15/05)].  The  set  of  feasible  actions,  A,  equals 
{0, 0-2, 04,  06},  and possible output quantities Q = {1, 2}. Consumption can take on any 
of 81 equally spaced values between zero and 2-25.  Lastly, the technology relating action 
to the probability of each output is represented by 
a  P(q  =  1)  P(q  = 2) 
O  0-9  0.1 
0-2  0-6  0-4 
0-4  0-4  0-6 
0-6  0-25  0-75 
These parameters, along with those used for later examples, were chosen to display 
the  possible  characteristics of  the  economies  we  consider,  and thus  the  main choice 
criteria was that they resulted in readable graphs.  The figures presented are "typical" in 
that their general characteristics did not change over the set of parameters we explored. 
The function  s*(w)  for each case is displayed  in Figure 1.  As can be seen in the 
maximization problems, randomizing between any two feasible schemes yields the interpo- 
lated surplus along with the interpolated utility for the agent while satisfying the other 
constraints.  Thus the surplus functions must always be at least weakly concave over W 
Further, the surplus for the unobserved-action environment cannot exceed that for the 
full-information environment since we have only added constraints.  Note that since the 
y-axis  is in terms of real consumption units, the loss to imposing these constraints (the 
vertical distance between the functions) is also in terms of real consumption.  As Figure 
1 shows, this loss is extremely small at the egalitarian optimum (s*(w)  = 0) for this set 
of parameters.7 Nevertheless, the characteristics of optimal plans given unobserved action 
is markedly different than given full information. 
The upwards-sloping portion for the unobserved-action environment exists because 
the only incentive-compatible way to give an agent the ex ante utility of the lower bound 
on consumption  and the lower bound on action is to actually give the lower bound of 
consumption  and recommend  the lower bound  on  action  with  certainty.  For the left 
end-point in required utility, a higher required utility can deliver a higher surplus due to 
a higher expected level of action (Figure 2), and thus higher aggregate output from agents 
assigned that required utility.  This higher output is more than enough to compensate the 
7.  This result may be somewhat akin to large literature which computes welfare losses and almost always 
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agents for the higher action.  Note that the solution smooths over discrete points in A by 
mixing over adjacent points in A.  For yet higher values of  w, leisure is a normal good 
and thus decreases for both problems as w increases. 
Figures 3  and  4  respectively  display  the  unobserved-action  and  full-information 
consumption values  c as functions  of  w, a, and  q.  As anticipated in the discussion  of PHELAN  & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  861 
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incentive constraints for the unobserved action economy, whenever action is greater than 
zero, higher consumption is associated with higher outputs. That is, an individual is now 
bearing risk.  Further, for a given w, the difference in consumption over outputs is greater 
when the  assigned  action  is greater.  For the  full-information  solution,  other than co- 
incidental variations due to the finiteness of sets  C and A, consumption  does not vary 862  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
over outputs or assigned action.8 Lastly, note that given a distribution of required utilities 
do  one can derive from these pictures cross-sectional figures in consumption and effort. 
IV.  REPEATED  UNOBSERVED  ACTION  ECONOMIES. 
The ability of incentive-constrained model economies to help explain effort and consump- 
tion variability is more pronounced when we examine the dynamic or repeated versions 
of the previous model.  The repeated version  allows  a given individual's  consumption 
and effort to be variable over time and for the distribution of agent characteristics in the 
population  to change over time.  We emphasize here that such dynamic economies  can 
be  solved  by iteratively solving  for value  functions,  or in our case,  surplus functions, 
much like in optimal capital accumulation problems, but each step in the iteration defines 
linear programmes much like the static environments considered above. 
Here we assume that time is discrete and agents are assumed to discount at a common 
rate  8 < 1.  The social  problem is to maximize the discounted  sum of  social  surpluses 
subject to each agent receiving a given ex ante expected discounted utility.  The possible 
initial required discounted  expected utilities can be derived along the same lines as for 
the static economies.  For the full-information case the lower bound on the possible  set 
of such utilities,  !VT,  is that of receiving the lower bound on consumption and the upper 
bound on effort with certainty at every date.  For the unobserved-action case, the lower 
bound on utility is that of receiving the lower bound on consumption and the lower bound 
on  effort with  certainty at every date,  since  as before,  this  situation  can be  achieved 
unilaterally by each agent or 
VT=Ei=1 pt01 U(a  c),  W  =St=1  p1  U(a, C) 
Again, all utilities in between can be achieved by randomizing between these two extremes. 
We denote these sets  WT  = [W, WT]  for the  T-period environment where  T is a positive 
integer or infinity. 
In using discounted social surplus as the objective function we are implicitly assuming 
(as  in  Green)  that  society  can  borrow  and  lend  at  a  constant  rate  of  interest.  For 
convenience,  we set this rate equal to (1/,8)-1  so that the full-information solution will 
have no aggregate borrowing or lending.  A plan with zero (or positive) discounted social 
surplus is said to be feasible  even though the associated  contemporary surplus may be 
negative.  In this case future resources are brought forward though they must be repaid 
with interest at some point through the horizon  T  Alternatively, this can be viewed as 
society having the ability to invest resources in a productive technology,  accumulating 
reserves for subsequent  consumption.  For the unobserved-action  economy,  computed 
solutions  have this latter property.9 
As before,  we take as given  do(w), the fraction of agents at each initial  w.  As we 
shall establish carefully in the sections which follow,  for a finite T-period economy, the 
social  problem at date  1 can be  defined in terms of  the surplus function  for the  (T- 
1) -period economy.  For the infinitely-repeated economy, the social problem is recursively 
8.  If U(a,  c) were not separable then consumption could vary with assigned action for the full-information 
case.  With unobserved action, consumption varies with assigned action even with separability. 
9.  The assumption of a linear storage technology is crucial in allowing us to derive a feasible method for 
computing solutions  to the repeated unobserved-action  economy.  Specifically, without this assumption, it is 
no longer the case that an optimal allocation  can be found by separately maximizing the social surplus from 
each utility group.  Instead, one must solve for all contracts simultaneously as a function of the initial distribution 
of utilities do(w).  In the recursive formulation, it is the distribution of utilities at any given time which acts as 
the state variable for the economy.  Distributions do not make convenient state variables.  This type of linearity 
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defined in terms of its own surplus function.  The key, which again will be established 
carefully in the following  sections, is to consider the utility of an agent from tomorrow 
on as a choice variable today.  Thus the choice problem for society is to find for an agent 
required to have an ex ante expected discounted  utility of  w today the probability him 
taking action a E A today, having output q E Q today, receiving consumption c E C today, 
and being required to receive expected discounted utility w'E WTl1  from tomorrow-  on. 
We denote this probability HW  (a, q, c, w').10 As in the static problems, for given w E  WT, 
these chosen probabilities must satisfy certain conditions: 
First, the analogue of Cl,  that ex ante expected discounted utilities are satisfied, or, 
C5.  W  =ZAXQXCxWT1I  {U[a,  c]+/3w'}HI  (a, q, c, w'). 
Second,  the analogue  of  C2, that the chosen  probabilities of outputs given actions are 
consistent with nature, or, for all (a, q) E A x Q, 
C  6.  EZc x w  T1 (a, q,  c, w') = P(q I  a)  EQxcxWT  -I wT(a,  q, c, w'). 
Third, the analogue of C3 are that these represent valid probability measures, or, 
C7.  EIAxwCXWTl  H  (a, q, c, w') = 1  and  H  T(a,  q, c, w') -0 
forall  (a,q,cw')EAxQxCxWT_1. 
Lastly, for  the  unobserved-action  problem,  the  analogue  of  C4,  that the  contract be 
incentive compatible, or, for all assigned and alternative action pairs (a, d) E A x A, 
C8.  Y.QXCXWT_  {U[a, c]+pw'}IH  (a, q, c, w') 
P(q  d  I  >-E  QxCxWTh, {U[r,  C]+3,8w'}  H T(a, q, c, w').  ::"''QXXWT_  I  ,  P(q  Ia) 
Again each of these constraints holds separately for each w type and thus the optimal 
social  contract can be found  by separately maximizing the social  surplus from each  w 
type,  w E  WT.  At any given date, then, the plan that maximizes social surplus satisfies, 
Repeated Problem (RP).  Maximize  by  choice  of  probability  measures  Hw the 
objective function ST( W)  =  >.AXQXCX  WT_I  {(q  -  c) + p,s?(w')}H  (a, q, C,  w') subject to II 
satisfying C5 through C7, and for the unobserved action economy,  C8. 
The function S*  -  (w'):  WT-,  -> R on the right-hand side is assumed to give the solution 
surplus values  for the  (T -  1)-period  economy.  For the infinite-period economy,  it is 
assumed to give its own solution values.  That is, for here and the rest of the paper, when 
T is set equal to infinity, the notation  T-  1 is meant to equal infinity as well. 
The  T-period economy  is solved by solving the one-period (or static) problem and 
using its solution values to solve the two-period problem and so on.  The infinite-period 
economy  is solved  by finding a surplus function  sOO(  *  ) that, when put in the objective 
function  of  RP, returns solution  surplus values  equal to  sOO(  ).  This  can be  done  by 
choosing any initial guess for s,,(-)  and using it in the objective function of RP for every 
we  WO. The solution  values of these programmes are then used as the next guess for 
s.(-).  As with standard dynamic programming for the capital accumulation problem, 
this sequence  of guessed  functions will converge to the true sOO(*).  In the next section 
we guarantee this from theory. 
10. There is some abuse of the notation here.  Since w' can potentially take on a continuum of values, it 
is not proper to choose probabilities defined on all possible  (a, q, c, w') points.  Probabilities should be defined 
using  more general measure notation.  We do this  in the  later sections.  For now, the  notation is implicitly 
assuming a restriction that the number of possible future utilities is finite. 864  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
Both for the finite- and the infinite-period problems, we "grid" the relevant sets of 
possible utilities (WOO  or WT, WT-1,...)  allowing only a finite number of points in these. 
Then with actual finite or finite approximations to  sets A, Q, and  C, any stage in the 
computation  process  amounts  to  finding  a  solution  to  the  finite  linear-programming 
problem RP for a given  w and a given function  s(*)  arrived at either by solving  the 
(T-71)-period  economy  for  a finite-period problem  or from the  last iteration for the 
infinite-period problem.  These linear programmes have a finite number of variables and 
a finite number of constraints. The only potential problem is that the number of variables 
and constraints may be large.  Further, for each iteration there are as many programmes 
to solve as the number of grid points we allow in  WT. 
Solutions  for the full-information problem FIP, in the static environment, are also 
solutions to the full-information repeated environments.  Specifically, there is full insur- 
ance so that action and consumption  levels are variable only where tightenings are not 
possible  due to the finiteness of A and C as noted before. Moreover, future utilities w' 
are chosen  with certainty to yield the pre-specified initial utility  w and thus guarantee 
the  same action  and consumption  levels  over time.  If the future utility assignment of 
some measure 11W  were variable, then the mean could be assigned with certainty without 
affecting the initial prespecified utility w of the agent, but at least weakly raising surplus 
because the surplus function is at least weakly concave, and for non-trivial examples is 
strongly concave.  If this certain w' were not equal to the initial required w then consump- 
tion and work probabilities would vary over time. From the concavity of the agents utility, 
this stream of consumption  and leisure levels could be smoothed while holding ex ante 
utility constant but raising surplus. Thus to repeat, a solution to the static full-information 
problem is a solution to all the repeated problems whether the horizon T is finite or infinite. 
However, and much to the point of this paper, solutions to the repeated unobserved- 
action economy  do not have this property and can display variation in an individual's 
effort and consumptions over time with positive autocorrelation and variability in popula- 
tion distributions at a point in time. In particular, these distributions can now be non-trivial 
despite initial uniformity in the population.  Figures 5 through 8 display solutions to the 
infinitely-repeated unobserved-action problem using the same parameters as in the static 
problems for the point-in-time utility function, the technology  P(q I  a),  and the sets A, 
Q, and C.  We assume a discount rate of I8  = 08. 
The optimized surplus function for the infinitely-repeated unobserved action problem 
is displayed in Figure 5 along with the full-information surplus function and the surplus 
function associated  with infinitely repeating the solution  to the  T = 1 economy.  (Note 
that a static plan giving w to the agent with surplus s(w)  gives an expected discounted 
utility of (1/(1  -,8))  * w to the agent and discounted surplus (1/(1  -,3))  - s(w)  if infinitely 
repeated. This allows us to virtually copy the surplus functions from Figure 1 onto Figure 
5).  The  T =  x  unobserved  action  surplus lies  everywhere below  the  surplus from the 
full-information problem due to the added incentive constraints.  It lies everywhere above 
the T = 1 surplus because disallowing history-dependence in consumption and recommen- 
ded action is a binding constraint.  In fact, Figure 5 shows that much of the surplus lost 
from the agency problem is recovered when history-dependence  is allowed even for the 
relatively high rate of discount implied by /3 = 0-8. 
Allowing history-dependence also induces higher actions (Figure 6).  As in the static 
problem, the lower bound on utility w can be achieved only by giving the lower bound 
on consumption with certainty and thus, for the incentive constraint to hold, having to 
recommend the  lowest  action.  However,  allowing  history-dependence  does  lessen  the 
severity of this for w near the lower bound.  (Note  again that points not on the action PHELAN  & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  865 
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grid  are  achieved  through  randomization.)  Again,  away  from  these  points,  action 
decreases as w increases due to the normality of leisure. 
Allowing  history-dependence  in consumption  (Figure 7) greatly reduces the effect 
of contemporary output on consumption  as compared to the static problem (Figure 3), 
that is, it allows better contemporaneous smoothing. 866  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
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Figure 8 graphs the transition function in w as a function of  w, a, and q.  At both 
corners, this function lies on the black 450  line since the only way to achieve the endpoints 
of  WOO  is period-by-period  repetition of the extreme schemes used to generate  W1.  At 
all other points where action is greater than zero, high output implies higher w' tomorrow, 
low output lower w' tomorrow. 
IO  a-= -4a=*2,  q =  1 
a=  4,=2a=/4,q  \=-,qI2 
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Given  an  initial  w  and  a  random-number generator, one  can  use  the  functions 
HT  (a,  q, c, w')  to generate individual time series of utilities, consumptions,  or actions. 
One simply keeps track of the w' generated each period and uses it as the initial condition 
for the next.  Figures 9 and 10 display four such series for consumption  and expected 
discounted utility w for the same parameters as used earlier except for the discount factors 
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these graphs are not easily readable at higher /  values.  Figures 9 through 12 are most 
readable for higher /  values.)  Each agent's initial w is set such that s,(w)  =0.  This is 
the  highest  ex  ante expected  discounted  utility which  can be  assigned  equally to  the 
agents and thus represents the ex ante "fair" Pareto optimum. 
The probability measures H w  also allow one to chart population  distributions over 
time.  Figures 11 and 12 (where again /3 and 8 = 0 95) demonstrate that if every agent is 
given  "fair" w initially that over time expected  utilities and consumptions  spread out 
giving  non-trivial  diversity  in  the  population  at  a  point  in  time.  For  other  chosen 
parameters, diversity in action levels will exist for the same reasons.  Although for our 
computed examples, the steady-state population distribution is degenerate due to absorb- 
ing states at the  endpoints, it takes hundreds of periods for this absorption to significantly 
affect the distribution when starting at the fair w.11  The endogenously generated diversity 
we display suggests that incentive problems may account for a non-trivial portion of the 
diversity in consumption and work levels present in the economy. 
V. JUSTIFICATION  OF  METHODS. 
In this section we justify the recursive methods used to formulate and solve the repeated 
problems.  Specifically, we formulate the planning problem directly on the set of measures 
11. We are not  sure if  there exist  non-degenerate  steady  states in the  environment of  this paper.  In 
computed solutions,  agents seem to simply walk away from each other until they hit an absorbing state at one 
or the other endpoint  in utility.  We have, however, just  discovered Thomas and Worrall (1990)  who show 
analytically in the infinite-horizon version of Townsend (1982) that the steady state is always degenerate.  The 
agent's (borrower's) utility becomes  arbitrarily negative with probability one. PHELAN & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  869 
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defined on the possibly  infinite-dimensional  space  of  individual histories. We show in 
Theorem 1 that a solution exists.  We then show that at any point in time and any history 
to that point,  the expected  discounted  utility of  any given agent from that time on is 
sufficient to describe the history of that agent along an optimal path; in a sense then one 
can start the problem over at any point.  (Theorem 2).  This allows us to show the optimal. 
surplus or value function  satisfies a recursive functional relationship.  Further, one can 
then  convert  over  to  a  space  which  replaces  lotteries  over  contemporary  outcomes 
conditioned  on histories to lotteries conditioned  on expected  discounted  utilities.  This 
conversion requires a reduction of the incentive constraint from one defined on contingent 
sequences  of deviations over the entire time-horizon to an apparently simpler incentive 
constraint concerning only  one-date-at-time deviations given obedience  from that date 
on.  That this reduction is valid is the thrust of Theorem 3.  Finally, for the case of an 
infinite time-horizon, Theorem 4 argues the existence of a unique surplus or value function 
satisfying the functional  equation,  with an associated  maximal policy  for the original 
problem. 
The use  of  measure notation  is  necessary  because  the  space  of  possible  ex  ante 
utilities is not finite but we want to define probabilities on it.  Given this, there are no 
additional complications to allowing the sets A, Q, and C to be general compact subsets 
of the real line, finite or not. 
The most general formulation of the problem of finding the optimal social contract 
for the repeated environments is to have as the social choice variable the joint probability 
measure over entire lifetime sequences of events for each agent given his initial required 
ex ante expected discounted utility. This allows the dependence of time t choice variables 870  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
on all previous information.  If we let H  be the set of triplets H = {h =  (a, q, c) I  a E A, 
q E Q, c E C}, then we can define H T  (T a finite integer or infinity) as the possibly infinite 
cross-product space  HT-X1T  H,  where a generic element  hT E HT  is a sequence  (or 
history) of recommended actions, outputs, and consumptions for a given agent starting 
at date  1 and  going  through date  T, possibly  infinity.  We use  superscripts to  denote 
sequences up to and including the superscripted date, as in  hT e  HT  and subscripts to 
denote  the  elements  of  such  sequences.  That is,  for a given sequence  h  T  notation  h, 
denotes the (a, q, c) triplet associated with date t, and for the cross-product set H T  H, 
denotes the set of possible date t triplets.  Lastly, wherever we use notation indicating a 
series from date t to date T, if T equals infinity we mean the infinite sequence from date 
t on. 
With real-valued compact sets A and Q, we define the exogenous technology relating 
an agent's effort to his output as a probability measure P(q I  a).  Measure P  is defined 
on measure space [Q, O@  (Q)] where O@  (Q) is used to denote the Borel subsets of Q. Thus 
the  object  q in  P(q I  a)  is  such  a  Borel subset,  q e  02(q).  The number P(q I  a)  in the 
interval [0, 1] gives the fraction of agents taking action a whose resulting output q is an 
element of set q. 2  Fractions P(q I  a)  are viewed  also as probabilities by the individual 
agents.  Further, for  any  action,  measure  P(  Ia)  is  associated  with  strictly positive 
continuous density over the set of outputs Q.  This guarantees that all observed quantity 
sequences  are possible  given  any  action  strategies,  and  thus  we  avoid  any  "off-the- 
equilibrium-path" considerations.  Finally, no additional restrictions such as monotone 
likelihood  ratio or convexity  conditions  on P(  I  a)  are required; these are made in the 
literature on principal-agent problems in efforts to secure analytical solutions. 
Let Do define the initial measure of lifetime expected  discounted  utilities owed to 
the agents.  For each generic subset w in the Borel subsets of  WT, Oh(  WT), number Do(w) 
gives  the  fraction of  agents whose  initial  required utilities  w are elements  of  set  w.13 
Unlike the introductory sections,  we no  longer assume measure Do has finite support, 
but still assume a countable support for technical reasons.  Lastly, for real-valued compact 
sets A and C, we require that  U[a, c] both be bounded  on A x C and be continuous. 
A measure FT(h  T)  returns for a given initially required discounted expected utility 
W  E WT and each generic subset hT E Oh  (HT)  the fraction of agents whose actual possibly- 
infinite sequences  of  actions,  outputs, and consumptions  are elements  of  h  T.  It is this 
measure for each w E WT  that is taken as the choice variable for society. 
For simplicity of notation, we will denote the marginal measures implied by a given 
FW  on subsequences of events starting at date 1 and going to date t < T as14 
fw(h')-|  HdFw(hT).  (1) 
fh'xH,+Ix  ..  *XHT} 
A social  contract is a set of measures FW for all  w E WT  satisfying the constraints 
defined below, namely C9, C0,  and C1,  the analogues of C1, C2, and C4 for the static 
economy.  The first constraint is that the required discounted  expected  utilities for the 
agents are actually satisfied if agents follow the recommended actions, or for all w E WT, 
C9.  w  =  J  {'WT  =  -3t  U[at, ct]}dFw(hT). 
12. Note  here and below that subsets are denoted as lower case bold type. 
13. We will continue the notation $0( *  ) to denote the Borel subsets of the indicated sets. 
14. The use of sets under the integral sign denotes integration over the elements of that set. PHELAN & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  871 
For the second constraint note that as in the static problem, the probability weights 
on outputs are choice variables in FW  and thus must be constrained to be consistent with 
those  imposed  by nature.  For every date, and almost every history up to that date, a 
measure FW  implies a conditional probability measure of output given that history. Again, 
each of these measures must be constrained to be consistent with the exogenous technical 
measure P(q I  a).  That is, for all t, h'-t  E 0(H`1),  a, E 02(A), q, E $2(Q), 
C1o.  df,(h')=  f  P(q, I  a)dft(h,). 
J{h'1xa,xq,xC}  {h' -Ixa,xQxC} 
The interpretation follows.  Integrating measure ft  over C on the left-hand side of C10 
gives a probability measure defined on  02(Ht-l  x A x Q).  Hence the entire term on the 
left-hand  side  gives the  probability of  outcomes  in subset  ht'l  x at x qt.  This measure 
must agree with the measure arrived at on the right-hand side by integrating ft  over both 
Q and C to get a measure defined on X (H'  x A), and then deriving the joint probability 
over  htl  x at x qt by using  the underlying technology  P, a measure defined on  q and 
conditioned  on  contemporary action and trivially on history ht,.'  5  This constraint is 
essentially analogous to constraint C2 for the static problems. 
The third constraint concerns incentive  compatibility.  For repeated environments 
each agent can have a deviation strategy depending  on all information available to the 
agent at the time of the possible deviation.  An agent's strategy does not need to depend 
on any societal  aggregates since these are predetermined by a given plan {FFw}W  WT.  It 
is  impossible  for  a  single  agent  with zero  weight  to  affect these.  The  aggregates are 
predetermined because each agent believes the other agents will obey their action recom- 
mendations.  Incentive compatibility requires that given this it is weakly optimal for each 
agent to have the strategy of always obeying his own action recommendation. 
To  formally  describe  possible  deviations,  let  A, be  the  set  of  functions  mapping 
Ht'l  x A to A.  Define A&T  to be the set of  T length sequences {It}t=1,T  of such functions. 
An element AT  E AT represents a strategy of a given agent.  So again, an agent's strategy 
has  as  arguments the  actual  recommended  actions,  quantities,  and  consumptions  the 
agent realizes up to and including  t-  1, and the action recommended to him at time t. 
A strategy AT thus gives the agent's action at all times under all possible histories. 
Again, incentive compatibility requires that the strategy of taking the recommended 
action at all times under all histories is weakly optimal for all w E WT,  and  T E AT,  or that16 
Ci.  WI  T  {  T= Pt1  U[at,  ct]  }dFT(h  T) 
>  J|T  {T=l  p t1IU[6t(ht  ,  at),  ct]}dFw(h  I  T)  = W(  T) 
where  Fw(hT  T)  is the  probability  measure  facing  an agent  following  deviation  strategy 
8T  This  differs from measure Fw(h')  in that deviation actions alter the probabilities of 
outputs and thus must be taken into account, as in the incentive constraint for the static 
15. Given a probability measure ,u(a x b): 0(A  x B) -  [0, 1] and associated marginal  o(a): -0(A) -  [0, 1] 
where  w(a)--lJ.B  dj,(a, b),  conditional  measures y(b  a)  can be defined  (or chosen)  for almost all  a  with 
respect tow  such that ,(a  x b) =J  .,y(b  a) dw(a).  (Billingsley (1986, Section 33)).  We require that it is possible 
to choose  such conditional  probabilities to equal P. 
16. These can be imposed, and AT  can be restricted to deterministic strategies, without loss of generality 
using  revelation  principle  or  direct  mechanism  arguments.  See  Harris  and  Townsend  (1981),  Myerson 
(1979,1982),  and Townsend (1982). 872  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
environment.  Measure  F'(hTI  aT)  can  be  defined  such  that  for  all  a, E @4  (A), q, E 
?  (Q), cl E 0 ( C), *  .  aT  E 1?  (A), qT  E=  "  (Q),  CT  E 130(C), and ?6  E 
FT(h  |T  P[q1 |1(al)]  P[q2  1 2(hh,  a2)] 
J{hT  =axqlxclx  .* xaTxqTxcT}  P(q1 I  aJ]  P[q2 I  a2] 
P[qT  I  SAT(h 
- 
, aT)  (hT).(2 
..  P[qTJ(h  aT)] 
T 
Ratio P[q, I  8t(h1-1,  a,)]/P[q,  I  aJ] gives how many times more likely it is that q, E q, under 
strategy 87- than under the  recommended  strategy 8 T;  that is,  this  ratio updates  the 
weights on sequences with qt E qt to account for the use of strategy a  . 
For a given distribution of required ex ante expected utilities Do, the social problem 
is then to maximize by the choice  of measures {Fw}WEWT  over histories h  T  discounted 
social surplus, or, 
Problem 1 (P1).  Maximize by choice of {Fw}WeWT the objective function 
ST(DO)  fWTHT  {t=1  t1(qt-  ct)1dF(hT)dDo(w) 
subject to the FW  satisfying C9 through C1I for all w E WT. 
Note that since C9 through C1I must each hold separately for all w e  WT,  we can bring 
the  maximization  inside  the  integral over  WT and  consider  the  simpler  problem  of 
maximizing  the  surplus from each  w type.17  Although  to  guarantee a economy-wide 
optimum it is only necessary to maximize the surplus from the w elements of a support 
of Do, ther is no loss to requiring that surplus be maximized for all w = WT. This gives 
us 
Problem 2 (P2).  Maximize by choice of FW  the objective function 
ST (W)  3  t  p  ( qt-ct)}dFw(h) 
subject to FW  satisfying C9 through ClI. 
Denote the set of solutions to this problem {FW  }WE  WT with solution surplus values SAT(w). 
Theorem 1.  A solution to Problem  2 exists. 
Proof  (Outline of argument with some intuition).  Since A, Q, and C are compact 
metric spaces, set H  is compact metric space, and by a theorem of Tychonoff the infinite 
cross-product of  H,  HT  is  a compact  metric space,  even  if infinite-dimensional.  This 
implies that the space of measures  II on HT  is also compact (and metrizable) relative to 
the weak topology.18 
17. The assumption  of  a countable  support ensures that the outer integration is always defined.  This 
could have been avoided if we considered our choice variable one measure, FT, over  ?4(  WT  X HT)  instead of 
a continuum of measures FT for each wE  WT each over  41(HT)  and constrained FT to be consistent with Do. 
This was avoided  for expositional  reasons. 
18.  Probability measures on compact sets are "tight" (Billingsley (1968)) and then by Prohorov's theorem 
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The objective function of P2 can be shown to be continuous at any point FW  since 
it is defined by the integration of bounded continuous functions.  Similarly, the space TI 
restricted by C9 through C1I  can be  shown  to be  closed  because  one  is dealing with 
linear equality  and inequality  constraints.  If every element is some  sequence  were to 
satisfy some  linear inequality constraint but the limit point  did not,  one  can obtain a 
contradiction.  As  closed  subsets  of  compact  sets  are compact,  the  constraint set  for 
Problem 2 is compact. Continuous real-valued functions on non-empty compact topologi- 
cal spaces achieve maxima.  Note  that the constraint set is non-empty because for each 
w E WT  an FW  satisfying C9 through C I I can be created by mixing over the plans described 
earlier yielding the utility endpoints  w and w. Note  for this, and more generally below, 
that linear combinations of measures satisfying ClO and Cl  also satisfy ClO and ClI.  11 
Further simplification is now possible.  Specifically, the optimal FW*  are recursive in 
the  following  sense:  If  an  individual  starts with  expected  discounted  utility  w  and 
subsequently has history hT (which under F'*  gives him an expected discounted utility 
from r  + 1 on of w), FW*  might as well treat him from r + 1 on as if it were the first period 
of  a (T-  r)-period  economy  and the individual  is required to receive  w'. That is, the 
solution to a T-period economy can be stated in terms of the solution to (T -  r)-period 
economies, and the solution to the infinite-period economy can be stated in terms of itself. 
For a given FW  and almost every history up to time r, hT,  we can define the discounted 
expected utility of an agent from time  r+ 1 on,  Ww(h') as 
Ww(h)  {  JT{,T=T+l  ft-T-lU(at,  ct)}dFw(hT+l,  .. .,  hTI  Th,  (3) 
JH +  x- .. *XHT) 
where conditional probability measure Fw(hT+l x*** x hT I  h)  is defined (or chosen) such 
that for all hT x hT+l  x ...  x hT, 
Fw(hT  x hr+1  x...  x  hT) =  f  Fw(hT+l  x...  x hTl hT)dfw(hT).  (4) 
hTr 
Then, formally, we can state the recursive nature of the FWT  in Theorem 2. 
Theorem  2.  For all w E WT,  there  exists an optimalplan FW*  with thefollowingproperty: 
for  any finite-length history hT with associated expected discounted utility Ww(h'),  the 
probability measure on future events given that history, FW*(  - I  h  T)  can be chosen to be both 
consistent with equation 4  and  to equal FTo*T, an  optimal probability measure for  the 
(T -  r)-period economy  for  an individual required to receive Wi  =  Ww(hT).  (Note  that for 
the infinite-period  economy the solution to the (T-  r)-period economy is the same as the 
solution to the T-period  economy, namely FW*  = FWTT for all w E WOO.) 
Proof  19  Fix a positive measure subset of time-r histories with respect to the optimal 
plan FW*,  denoted hT  E 04(HT).  Suppose for almost all of the hT  E hT  there exists a new 
plan for determining the continuation fractions, Fw(* Ih), that generates a higher discoun- 
ted  surplus  from  r +1  on  than  the  continuation  plan  FW*(  -I ET), that  is, 
(T(h)  (  {  )xHT  {ETqt  ptT-(q  -  ct) }dFw(  hT+I,..X  hT I  hT) 
{H  +I  x...  X HT} 
>J  .xHT}  {  ETl=T+1/  (qt -  ct)  }dFw*(hT+I,*  ,  hT  I  hT)  ) 
{H  +I X . . . X HT( 
(5) 
19. This proof follows  a line of argument in Spear and Srivastava (1987). 874  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
with  history-contingent  surpluses 
- (h)  and  o*(h)  defined  on  the  left  and  right 
equalities.  Further suppose that this new plan FT(  I  h)  satisfies conditions C9 through 
C11 if time  r is taken as time zero and  W'(h)  is taken as the initial required utility. 
The collection of measures F  *  I  h) for each hT  E hT  can be used to define a time-zero 
plan FW. First, simply define the collection  of conditional  measures FT( -I  h')  over all 
of HT, not just the preselected subset hT,  by letting Fw(  I  hT)  FW*I h')  for hT  '  hT  so 
that the old optimal plan is not changed off the branches in h. Also no change is made 
to  the  old  optimum  on  or before  date  r.  This  allows  us  then  to  define  FW for  all 
hTx h,+l x  *  x hT E 0(HT)  as 
Fw(hT  x hT+l x *** x hT)  TF(h+l  x***  x hT I  hT)df,(h).  (6) 
The fact that for each  original  w type,  Fw(- I  h')  gives  exactly  the same continuation 
utility to the agent after any time r history implies that the ex ante utility of the agent is 
the same under FW  as under FWT,  so that FW  satisfies C9. Further, that the Fw(- I  h-) each 
satisfy CIO insures that FW  also does. 
Discounted surplus from the perspective of time zero is greater under FW  than under 
FWT  because  surplus at time zero is the discounted  sum of outputs over consumptions 
through date  r and the discounted surplus from r + 1  on. That is, 
ST()JH{z=f3(q-  ct) +P8rJT(h T)}dfw(hT)  S W)  5  Et=l  p  qc} 
>  i|  {t  f3  t(q  qt-c)  +8T4(hT)}dfw*(h')  -ST(w),  (7) 
since  by the definition  of FW  (equation  (6)), fw(h)  =fw*(hT)  and also that  r(h)  >  4(h') 
for hT  E hT and equal elsewhere. 
We need only to show that FW  is incentive compatible from the perspective of time 
zero, and we contradict our original assumptions, since if FW  is within the constraint of 
the time-zero problem and gives a higher discounted  surplus than FW*,  then FW*  could 
not have been optimal. 
Claim.  FW is incentive  compatible from  time zero. 
Proof of Claim.  Suppose not. Then there exists a deviation plan  8T  E AT such that 
|  ~j <JHT  {tl=  1 1  U[  8a(ht-,  at),  ct] }dFw(hT  )  w  T)  (8) 
where w* is the discounted expected utility of the agent under obedience  and plan FW*T 
w is the same but under plan FW  and obedience,  and F  W( I 'AT) is the measure defined 
Al  ~~~~~~AT  by FW and the deviation strategy 8  as in equation  (2).  For a given history at time  r, 
the agent has a discounted expected utility from that point on of following the deviation 
strategy that can be denoted  Ww(hT,  AT).  Equation (8) can be rewritten as 
w <  (gT)  f  {Ws  t-l  U[8t(ht-',  at), c] + pTWw(hT  a  )}dfr(h  8  )  (9) 
From the incentive compatibility of the Fw( *  I  h')  we can replace  Ww(hT,  8T)  in (9) with 
the discounted expected utility of following a strategy of obedience from r + 1 on, denoted 
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on.  This in turn can be replaced by  W'(hT), the discounted expected utility of the agent 
if plan FWT(. I  hT) is followed,  due to the fact that plan F  *  I  hT) satisfies constraint C9 
from the perspective of time  r, that is that it delivers the same utility to the agent from 
the perspective of hT  having occurred.  Lastly, it follows that for any particular deviation 
plan aT,  fw(hT  ) =fw*(hT  j8T)  (since no change is made in the old optimum through 
date  7  and thus fw(h')  =fw  (hT))  and this replacement can be made in (9) also.  This 
allows us to write 
w* <  f  {,t=,  t  U[8t(h  , at),  ct]  +  PTWw*(hr)  dw*(hr  a  (10) 
The right-hand side  of  equation  (10)  is  the utility of  following  aT  up  to  time  r  and 
obedience afterward  under the old plan FW*. If 8T  specifies obedience up to and including 
time T then equation (10) would be an equality and we have a contradiction.  Assuming 
gT  does imply deviation on or before time  7, if we alter strategy AT to obedience  after 
date X,  we have derived another deviation strategy AT  such that w* < w*(gT),  which is 
a contradiction due to the assumed incentive compatibility of the time zero optimal plan. 
This proves the claim of the incentive compatibility of  F  ,  implying FW is within 
the constraint set of the time zero problem, contradicting the optimality of Fw*. Thus, 
for all  7, and almost all histories hT, the surplus from  r +1  on of following  the original 
optimum,  '*(h'),  is the maximal surplus from 7+1  on. Thus there is no loss in surplus 
from at every date  7  pretending it is the first date of a (T -  T)  economy  and the initial 
required utility w is  W'*(h').  All other information in hT can be ignored.  jj 
We are now well on the way to reducing the original maximum problem to finding 
a function  satisfying  a recursive functional  relationship.  In particular, we  now  know 
from Theorem 2 that optimized surpluses s*(w)  satisfy the recursive relationship, 
ST(W) =  {(q1 -  cl) + ps*-,[  W*(hl)]}  dfw*(hl).  ( 11) 
HI 
Note from this that the optimized surplus today is determined only by the measure 
on one-period histories f'  (hl),  the function sA_-(w)  and the function  W*(h1).20 For a 
T-period economy, we can derive fromfl*(hl)  and W*(hl) a probability measure gT  (h1 x 
w) determining the joint probability weights on an agent having a given history h1 today 
and expected discounted utility w from tomorrow.  Measure gw*(h, x w) gives the fraction 
of agents whose one-period history paired with end-of-period expected discounted utility 
is an element of h, x w, and can be defined for all h, x w E OI/(Hl  x WT-1) by 
gw  (hlxw)-C  f  I(hl,  w')dw'dfw*(h,)  (12) 
where  for  indicator  function  I  H1 x WT-1  -  {O, 1},  I(hl,  w') = 1 if  W*(hl) = w' and  0 
otherwise, and the Fw implying fl  is now assumed to satisfy the recursive property in 
Theorem 2.  Notation  w' is used to denote expected utility as of the end of the first period 
from tomorrow on and w is for initial required utility.  Note  (12) implies that for almost 
all h, with respect to fw* the implied conditional of  w' on h, is degenerate; a particular 
number w' is always assigned for each history. 
(12) allows us to express (11) as 
s*(w)  =  {(q  -  cl) + Ps*i(w')}dgw*(h1,  w').  (13) 
2H0X  WT-At 
20.  This  is  analogous  to  what  Abreu,  Pearce,  and  Stacchetti  call  factorization. 876  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
This allows us to find solutions to finite T-period problems by finding the functions 
g;v*(hl,  w') for all t '  T and all w E W,. For the infinitely-repeated problem we need only 
to find the function g'* (hl,  w') for all w E WOO.  To do either we need to search over the 
class of possible measures g'(hl,  w') on H1 x WT-1, where again T may be infinity, (and 
thus T-1  equals infinity as well.) 
A collection  of arbitrary measures g'  for all t '  T and all w E Wt, each degenerate 
on some end-of-period  utility w' for almost all hl,  defines a collection  of measures F'T 
over entire histories  hT  (for all  we  WT) by successively  applying the appropriate g'. 
Marginal measure flw, over initial hl,  is defined by integrating g'  over w'.  Measure fV, 
over (hl,  h2) can then be obtained by integrating g1-,  over w' and using fw to determine 
the weights on the first-period histories, while keeping track of the end-of-period utilities 
associated with those first-period histories.  This is repeated for f3' and further.21 
In order to be  able to  compute  optimal plans we need to  know what restrictions 
must be put on an arbitrary collection  of g,'  measures, {g'}tTw',  so that all of the  FT 
plans that {g'}  Tw.  imply satisfy constraints C9 through C1I if and only if these restrictions 
hold.  Condition  C9 is satisfied by the implied  FT  if and only if for all t '  T, w E W, 
C12.  w  =  f  { U[al,  cl] + Pw'}dgt'(hj, w'). 
{HIXWt-1) 
Constraint C12 simply requires that at the beginning of all dates, the w assigned in the 
last period, and used as a state variable now to select from the {g,'}  family, is actually 
the expected  discounted  utility of the agent assigned it.  Constraint CIO is satisfied by 
the implied  FT  if and only if all the g,v generate the correct conditional probabilities of 
outputs on actions, or for all a E 0(A),  q E 0(Q),  t  T, and w E Wt, 
C13.  dg"(a, q, c, w') =  {  P(q I  a)dg,  (a, q, c, w'). 
{axqxCxW,_j}  {axQxCxWt-1) 
The interpretation is analogous to C2. 
Lastly, the most subtle equivalence concerns the incentive constraints.  The result is 
summarized in Theorem 3. 
Theorem  3.  For  any  collection  of  measures  {gt}'tw,  satisfying  conditions  C12  and 
C13,  the  corresponding  explicit  history  measures  {FF}WC WT satisfy  incentive  compatibility 
(constraint C1)  if and only iffor  all t '  T, w e W and all functions 8: A -> A, 
(C14)  w--  I U[al,  cj] + 8w'}dgtw(hj w') 
IH,x  W,--,} 
'  |  { ~~U[S(a  1),  cl ] +8  pWI dg w (hl  w' I  ), 
{H,  X W,-,} 
where for axqxcxwGe4(AxQxCx  Wt-1), g w(axqxcxw  8)  is defined by 
A(  1^)-|  P(qj18(a))  gw"(axqxcx  wj)  JA(j  dg w  (a, q, c, w')  (14) 
the obvious analogue to (2). 
21.  Note for the case  T =  oo  that the ,V (Ht) on which the ft  are defined can be considered partitions or 
sub-sigma-algebras of sV(H').  Further, this sequence of partitions converges to  R(H')  and thus the sequence 
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Proof  Object w' is by condition  C12 the expected utility from tomorrow on of a 
non-deviation strategy from tomorrow on and thus condition C14 requires that there be 
no gain to  deviation  at any history given that the agent will not deviate in the future. 
Since condition  CII  requires that all contingent  strategies be weakly worse than non- 
deviation,  this  includes  the  specific  strategy of  deviating  at a given  history and then 
following non-deviation from then on. Thus we already have the necessity of C14 or that 
every FW  satisfies C 11 only if every gt,  t  T and w e  WT  satisfies C14. 
To get the sufficiency of C14 suppose there exists a collection {gt  }  tTj'  that all satisfy 
C14 but a corresponding  {FT}WE  WI  implied by this collection  does  not satisfy CI1  for 
some  initial  utility  w0.  This  implies  there exists  an  aTEA  T  such  that  w(8T)  =  W+ 
(e > 0),  where  w(6T)  denotes  the  expected  discounted  utility  of  the  agent  following 
strategy 8 T. Consider an alternative action strategy 8T  which follows  uT  Up through some 
finite date  r  T  T but assumes obedience  from 7+1  on.  Condition  C14 which assumes 
obedience  from tomorrow on thus implies for all h-l, 
r-(h  )  U[a,,  cJ]+  PWrw(h`-1  hT)}dFWT(hr  . . .  hT  Ihrl 
J{H  X...  XHT} 
>  l  {~~~U[  3TIPCT] 
J HTX-  ...  XHT} 
+,f3W(t  1,  )IdFw(h  T,  Tl  .hT  h-AT 
3 
w 
'w(q  aT).  (15) 
Stepping back one date, condition C14 again implies for all  hT2, 
WTW2(hT2)  J  I  H}  U[a7.1,  cr_]  + PWw  L(hr2  h,-7)}dFw(h-1  ...,  hT Ih 
fHx...  {U[8T1,  CI 
{H  -1lX . ..  X HT} 
+WTW_1(h- h,-,)IdFwT(h_,l,  I  , hTih2  AT)  (16) 
The  expression  W'  1(hT-2, h71)  on  the  right-hand side  of  (16)  represents the  utility 
corresponding to obedience  from date  r on, even though AT allows disobedience at date 
r. If  we  replace  Ww  (hT2,  h,l)  on  the  right-hand  side  with  W_1(h2,  h_1  j  T)  that 
is,  the  utility  associated  with  disobedience  at  date  r,  (15)  ensures  the  inequality  is 
maintained.  This gives 
W-  2(hT2){H  |  {Ut8T1,  C-1] 
{HT-lX..  XHT} 
+pWw1  (hT  , hT 118  )}dl%(h71,**  , hTIh  aT) 
WTW2(h  a8)  (17) 
Repeating this stepping back to  t = 1 gives 
w0? w(T).  (18) 
For a finite T, if we choose  Xr  T we have generated a contradiction since  aT  =  aT 
but the utility associated with strategy aT  is weakly worse than obedience  (18) and the 
utility of strategy 8T  is assumed strictly greater than obedience.  For the infinitely-repeated 
case, denote  iwv  as the greatest element of  W,, and w as its least element.  If we choose 878  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
date  r  sufficiently  great  pT.(w-w)<s  we  have  Iw(8T)-w(8T)Is,  or  a 
w(8T)  -  e.  Substitution from (18) gives  w0> w(8T)  -  ,  which is a contradiction due to 
the initially assumed equality w(8T) =  w0+ e. 
Now  again let {F'*  WEWT  denote a solution  to P2 satisfying the recursive property 
of  Theorem  2,  and  s*(w)  denote  the  solution  values.  We know  from above  that the 
associated  {g'  *}wYTw  satisfying C12 through C14 and any other set  {gw}lw'T  satisfying 
C12 through C14 must induce a set {FF}wEWT with a lower surplus from the optimality 
of  set  {Fw*}WEWT.  This implies that s*(w)  must be the maximal value of the objective 
function in 
Problem 3 (P3).  Maximize by choice of gw the objective function 
ST(W)-|  {(q  -  c) +,8ps_1(w')}dgw(h1,  w') 
{H  x  WT-1) 
subject to constraints C12 through C14. 
For finite-period problems, one can start with the one-period problem (where s* = 0 
everywhere and  Wo  = {0}) to find s*  and the set {gw*}  WE'w and then solve P3 given s,  to 
solve the two-period problem and repeat until period T  For infinite-period problem, we 
need to derive a method  of  finding the maximal surplus function  s*(w).  We can then 
characterize a solution  to  Problem P1 as the probability measure on infinite sequences 
hoo implied  by  the  set  {gwl}WEW  which  solves  P3  given  s*(-).  To  find  s*(-),  we  can 
define an operator T mapping functions s00(*) into functions  TsOO()  by letting, for every 
w  E=  WOO  , 
Tsoo(w)  maxgw  }  {(q1- cl)+ps(w')}dgw(h1,  w) 
I  HI x  WOO 
subject to conditions  C12 through C14.  (19) 
We know from the statement of Problem P3 that Ts*( - ) = s*( - ).  Theorem 4 states that 
no other function soo(*) has this property and delivers a method of finding s*(*). 
Theorem 4.  Mapping Tas  defined in (19) maps bounded continuousfunctions on WOO 
into bounded continuous  functions on WOO.  Moreover, T is a contraction  mapping,  thus there 
exists a unique  function s*  such that Ts* ( - ) = s* ( - ). 
Proof.  A  maximum  exists  over  gw  for  the  right-hand side  of  (19)  because  the 
objective function is an integral over bounded continuous functions defined on H1 x WOO 
and hence is continuous  in the weak topology,  and the constraint set q'(w) is compact. 
Set q(w)  is compact because the constraints are linear equalities or inequalities and hence 
p(w) is closed and the set of unrestricted measures on H1 x WOO  is compact.  That is, the 
constraint set is a closed subset of a compact set and hence is itself compact. Continuous 
functions on compact sets achieve their maxima.  -- 
That  TsOO(*)  is bounded  is trivial given the compactness  of  H1 and the supposed 
boundedness  of soo(*). The continuity of  TsOO(*)  in w follows  from familiar arguments. 
The objective function of (19) is trivially continuous in w as well as in the choice objects; 
utility level w doesn't enter as an argument. The constraint set,  p(w),  is lower semicon- 
tinuous.  This follows  because any point g'  in set  p(w) can be attained as the limit of a 
sequence  of  gOfl E p(w')  as  w'  goes  to  w.  If  w'  were  to  approach  w  from  above,  for 
example, then one  can construct the g"fl as the appropriate weighted  combinations  of 
g'  and  the  scheme  yielding  the  upper  end  point  w.  This  uses  the  fact  that  linear 
combinations of measures satisfying constraints C13 and C14 also satisfy C13 and C14 PHELAN & TOWNSEND  COMPUTING  CONSTRAINED  OPTIMA  879 
and thus one  simply chooses  the appropriate weights such that the linear combination 
gives the appropriate expected utility to satisfy constraint C12. The argument generalizes 
to all w'-> w. 
Also, the constraint set p(w) is upper semicontinuous.  That is, if w"  -> w, and g900  90 
with gwn E p(w')  then gw E Cp(w).  This follows as with the establishment of the closedness 
of the constraint set above.  Then the analogue of the maximum theorem given in Debreu 
(1959), here for a metric space, gives the desired result. 
To  establish  T  is  a  contraction  mapping  on  this  space  of  bounded  continuous 
functions, it suffices to note that the Blackwell sufficient conditions  are satisfied: 
(i)  If s't  s"  then  Ts'-'  Ts", and 
(ii)  For any constant K, T(s+K)=  Ts+f8K,  0<3<1. 
Existence and uniqueness of a function s* satisfying s* = Ts* follows from the contraction 
property.  Further iterations from s to  Ts to  T2s and so on are ensured to converge to 
s*  for any starting value s,,. 
VI.  NOTES  ON  COMPUTATION. 
This section  outlines the nature of the numerical algorithm used to compute solutions 
for a grid of utilities on  W,  t :  T, and grids on the sets A, Q, and C. We also make clear 
the sense in which our solutions  approximate the solution where these sets can take on 
a continuum of values. 
For a given function s* L(*) or guess s.(*)  and initial w, finding st(w) or Ts.(w)  is 
an infinite linear programme literally having a continuum of choice variables, the mass 
to put on every point in the support of gw, and if set A or Q is continuous, a continuum 
of constraints since C14 must hold for all possible  strategies, and C5 for all q e A (Q). 
If one imposes  a grid on A and Q, that is allows (a, q) to take on only a finite number 
of points, then the number of constraints becomes finite.  If one imposes a grid on  W,_1 
and C as well, then the number of choice variables becomes finite, and function s,-1(  ) 
defined on  Wt-1 is a finite-length vector.  This makes s*(w)  or Ts"(w) the solution to a 
finite linear programme for a given function  s*(  *) or guess s,(  *).  Such programmes 
can be computed using standard revised simplex algorithms.  The entire function s*(*) 
or Ts,,(-)  is obtained by finding s*(w)  or Ts(w) for all wE Wt, where  Wt is the grid on 
the appropriate W,. Further, the contraction theorem (Theorem 4) still applies even when 
WO  is restricted to a grid, so iteration over these functions for a given grid WOO  is ensured 
to converge.  The converged solutions and associated policies  are the ones we report. 
Now  return to the unrestricted set H1 x W,-_. By imposing finer and finer grids on 
H1 and Wt-1, for instance by uniformly distributing the elements and successively doubling 
the number of values they can take on (call these sets (H1 x  Wt1):  n = 1, oo). We get a 
sequence  of solutions  {gw}wew"1,  n = 1, oo which are valid measures on the unrestricted 
space  H1 x Wt-1.  Moreover,  as a sequence  on  a compact  metric space,  at least some 
subsequence  must converge,  say to  {gI  }Wf:W.  Yet this must yield the same surplus as 
{g t*}WE ww since  any true maximizer  for an unrestricted  H1 and  Wt_1 can be approximated 
arbitrarily  closely by measures in sufficiently refined grids given that the actual technology 
P, (a measure on the unrestricted Q x A) can be closely approximated on grided sets Q 
and A. 
Finally, large gains are realized in the size and speed of computation of these linear 
programmes if one can separate each period into sub-periods as is easily the case with 
a separable utility function.  Here it is the case that the expected utility of the agent also 880  REVIEW OF  ECONOMIC  STUDIES 
sufficiently describes history  in the middle of a period, after the output is realized but 
before the consumption is handed out, for the same reasons as in the proof of Theorem 
2.  This allows us to separately choose the joint probability of (a, q, wm) triplets given w, 
where wm is the utility of the agent in the middle of the period, and the joint probability 
of  (c, w') pairs given  wm where, as before,  w' is the expected  discounted  utility of the 
agent at the beginning of the next period. 
This breaks each linear programme into two smaller ones. The programme choosing 
the probabilities  over (a, q, wm)  triplets has the  same number of  constraints since the 
number of consumption points did not affect the number of constraints but has far fewer 
variables.  For a gridded set C with nc elements, the number of variables in the smaller 
programme will be  1/nc the number of variables in the original problem.  The second 
linear programme choosing the probabilities of (c, w') pairs has only two constraints (that 
required utility is satisfied and that probabilities add to one)  and thus runs extremely 
quickly.  The adoption of this method allowed  us to move from solving these problems 
on a CRAY supercomputer to a fast PC. 
VII.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS. 
The methods we present are more general than they may appear.  For instance, the source 
of the incentive problem does  not appear important.  This allows  similar arguments to 
those given to apply to repeated private-preference shock economies, or repeated private- 
endowment shock economies  such as Green (1987).  Since Green's model does not have 
actions, simply let the set A have one element and thus remove the incentive constraints 
on actions. Because Green has unobserved endowments  (or unobserved q) we need to 
add constraints to require that those with high outputs do not claim to have low outputs, 
or, for all (q, q)  E Q x Q (where q < q), 
I  cX  U[ a, c] +83w'}TIt  '(a,  q, c, w')'-cx  w,-  [  cq]+3  }r,(  c  ) 
(20) 
This replacement of constraints does not upset the logic of the earlier arguments. 
We have also  shown  in an earlier working paper version  (Phelan  and Townsend 
(1988))  that optimal renegotiation-proof  contracts can be found  by suitably restricting 
the  utility sets  W such that they induce  non-increasing  surplus functions  over  w, but 
otherwise solving the same programming problems.  But the restriction to renegotiation- 
proof  contracts does  make a difference.  Without it, as in the body  of this paper, the 
optimal solution  enters the upwards surplus regions, in which case, ex post, all agents 
can be made better off by starting over.  In any event, this method of restricting utility 
sets also appears promising for computing other limited commitment environments such 
as Atkeson (1988) where international borrowers (agents) can withdraw from the credit 
system at any time with the utility associated with autarky given their present amount of 
capital. 
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